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We outline a straightforward approach for obtaining a secret key rate using only no-signaling
constraints and linear programming. Assuming an individual attack, we consider all possible joint
probabilities. Initially, we study only the case where Eve has binary outcomes, and we impose con-
straints due to the no-signaling principle and given measurement outcomes. Within the remaining
space of joint probabilities, by using linear programming, we get bound on the probability of Eve
correctly guessing Bob’s bit. We then make use of an inequality that relates this guessing probabil-
ity to the mutual information between Bob and a more general Eve, who is not binary-restricted.
Putting our computed bound together with the Csisza´r-Ko¨rner formula, we obtain a positive key
generation rate. The optimal value of this rate agrees with known results, but was calculated in a
more straightforward way, offering the potential of generalization to different scenarios.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd
I. INTRODUCTION
A nonlocal realistic model, the de Broglie-Bohm the-
ory, is not only consistent with quantum theory but
also coherently describes measurement processes includ-
ing wave-function collapse [1]. This raises a question if all
realistic models must be nonlocal to be consistent with
quantum theory, which led to the discovery of Bell’s in-
equality [2, 3].
Recently, the nonlocality involved with Bell’s inequal-
ity and entanglement has entered a new phase of its de-
velopment. It turned out that entanglement is a concrete
physical resource for information processing [4]. In the
same context, interestingly, it was found that with non-
local correlations we can generate a cryptographic key, a
private random shared sequence, whose security relies on
only the no-signaling principle [5–7]. For this, no quan-
tum theory is used for the security analysis. However, the
only currently available way to realize nonlocal correla-
tions is by using quantum entanglement. So these pro-
tocols are called no-signaling quantum key distribution
(QKD). Remarkably, what is used to show security in no-
signaling QKD is only the outcomes of measurements. As
long as the outcomes satisfy a certain condition, security
is provided, no matter how the outcomes are generated.
Thus, no-signaling QKD has device-independent security.
To satisfy the security condition, detector efficiency must
be much higher than what is currently achievable.
In Refs. [6, 7], the security of no-signaling QKD
∗Email: wyhwang@jnu.ac.kr
against individual attacks has been analyzed in a novel
way, exploiting the intrinsic structure of no-signaling
probabilities [10, 11]. In particular, by fixing the size of
the input and output alphabets that are used to generate
a secret key between the legitimate parties, a finite set
of extremal points are distinguished. Information about
the no-signaling polytope structure leads to huge simpli-
fications in the security analysis. In Ref. [12], security
against individual attacks was shown using the insight
that no-signaling and non-local probabilities are gener-
ally monogamous. Indeed, a monogamy relation that is
valid for no-signaling probabilities is explicitly employed
to show the security. This approach can be applied even
if the eavesdropper’s alphabet is not binary [12, 13].
In this paper, we present a security analysis of no-
signaling QKD protocols by numerically optimizing no-
signaling probabilities. This explicitly shows that direct
optimization over no-signaling probabilities can be used
as the main theoretical tool to prove security. Specifi-
cally, we consider the protocol proposed by Acin, Mas-
sar, Pironio (AMP) [7, 8]. To motivate the advantage of
our approach, we note that the method in Refs. [6, 7] re-
lies on the specific structure of certain no-signaling poly-
topes shown in Refs. [10, 11]. However, it seems that the
generalization to larger alphabets or higher dimensions
is much harder to analyze; see for instance Ref. [14].
Nevertheless, our result provides a straightforward en-
hancement to the analysis of no-signaling probabilities,
and the formalism could potentially be applied to even
more complicated scenarios.
This paper is organized as follows. First we consider
Eve’s (an eavesdropper’s) guessing probability about
Bob’s (a receiver’s) bit. That is, we consider the case that
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2Eve’s outcomes are binary. Within the remaining space
of joint probabilities, we maximize PE , the probability
that Eve correctly guesses Bob’s bit, by linear program-
ming. Then, we derive a bound on the mutual informa-
tion between Bob and a general Eve (whose number of
outcomes is now unrestricted), IBE , by using the maxi-
mal PE . A key generation rate K is obtained by using the
Csisza´r-Ko¨rner formula [15]. In our case, K = IAB−IBE ,
where IAB is the mutual information between Alice (a
sender) and Bob.
II. MAIN CONTENTS
A. AMP protocol
Two users, Alice and Bob, attempt to distribute a Bell
state, |φ+〉 = (1/√2)(|0〉A|0〉B + |1〉A|1〉B), where A and
B denote Alice and Bob, respectively, and |0〉 and |1〉
compose an orthonormal basis of a quantum bit (qubit).
To mimic a realistic case with channel noise, we assume
the Bell state was transformed to a Werner state
ρ = p|φ+〉〈φ+|+ (1− p)I
4
, (1)
where 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. Although we use the Werner state to
model potential data, our method does not rely on this.
For each copy of the distributed state, Alice chooses the
value of an index x among 0, 1, and 2 with probabili-
ties q, (1 − q)/2, and (1 − q)/2, respectively. Then she
performs a measurement Mx on her qubit. M0 is a mea-
surement composed of the projections {|+〉〈+|, |−〉〈−|}
where |±〉 = (1/√2)(|0〉 ± |1〉). M1 and M2 are mea-
surements composed of {|pi/4〉〈pi/4|, |5pi/4〉〈5pi/4|} and
{| − pi/4〉〈−pi/4|, | − 5pi/4〉〈−5pi/4|}, respectively. Here,
|φ〉 = (1/√2)(|0〉+ eiφ|1〉) is a state obtained by rotating
the state |+〉 around the z-axis by an angle φ. Bob also
chooses a value of his index y for each copy, either 0 or
1, with probabilities q′ and 1− q′, respectively. Then he
performs a measurement Ny on his qubit. Here N0 = M0
and N1 is composed of {|pi/2〉〈pi/2|, |3pi/2〉〈3pi/2|}. Next,
both Alice and Bob publicly announce their values x
and y for each copy. Measurement outcomes in the case
x = y = 0 are kept and used to generate the key. Out-
comes from other cases are publicly announced to esti-
mate Eve’s information. Alice and Bob choose q and q′
close to 1 so that almost events are in the case x = y = 0.
This does not affect the security in the asymptotic case
we consider.
B. Constraints on the probability distributions
We assume an individual attack in which Eve follows
the same procedure for each instance. For each choice
of measurements x and y by Alice and Bob, there is a
joint probability for measurement outcomes a, b, e for Al-
ice, Bob, and Eve, respectively. The joint probability for
a, b, e, conditioned on measurements x and y is denoted
by P (a, b, e|x, y). Here, a and b are binary variables ac-
cording to the protocol. The number of Eve’s outcomes
e should be arbitrary in principle. However, for now we
consider the case that Eve’s outcome is binary. We do
this because we are interested in the guessing probabil-
ity, and Eve’s final guess has to be binary to match Bob’s
alphabet.
Let us write constraints for the joint probabilities.
First, they satisfy normalization∑
a,b,e
P (a, b, e|x, y) = 1 (2)
for each x, y. Let us denote the marginal distribution for
Alice and Bob,
∑
e P (a, b, e|x, y), by P (a, b,4|x, y).
The marginal distributions corresponding to the state
in Eq. (1) should be consistent with the measurement
outcomes. For the measurement basis choice (x = 0, y =
0) we have
P (0, 0,4|0, 0) = P (1, 1,4|0, 0) = p
2
+
1− p
4
,
P (0, 1,4|0, 0) = P (1, 0,4|0, 0) = 1− p
4
. (3)
For (x = 0, y = 1), where there is no correlation,
P (a, b,4|0, 1) = 1
4
(4)
for each a and b. For (x = 1, y = 0), (x = 1, y = 1), and
(x = 2, y = 0),
P (0, 0,4|x, y) = P (1, 1,4|x, y)
= 0.854
p
2
+
1− p
4
≡ α
P (0, 1,4|x, y) = P (1, 0,4|x, y)
= 0.146
p
2
+
1− p
4
≡ β, (5)
where the two numerical values, 0.854 and 0.146, are ob-
tained from measurement outcomes for the Bell state.
For (x = 2, y = 1),
P (0, 0,4|2, 1) = P (1, 1,4|2, 1) = β
P (0, 1,4|2, 1) = P (1, 0,4|2, 1) = α. (6)
Now we consider no-signaling conditions. Because the
marginal distribution for Alice and Eve must be indepen-
dent of Bob’s basis choice, we have
P (a,4, e|x, 0) = P (a,4, e|x, 1) (7)
for each x. Here we use a notation for marginal distribu-
tions analogous to the previous one. Similarly,
P (4, b, e|0, y) = P (4, b, e|1, y) = P (4, b, e|2, y) (8)
for each y. Another no-signaling constraint is that Eve’s
marginal distribution is independent of the basis choices
of Alice and Bob,
P (4,4, e|x, y) = P (4,4, e|0, 0) (9)
for each x, y.
3C. Maximizing guessing probability PE
Here we maximize the guessing probability, PE , for a
binary-restricted Eve within these constraints (2)-(9) by
linear programming.
For visual convenience, P (a, b, e|x, y) are denoted as:
P (a, b, e|0, 0) = xabe, P (a, b, e|0, 1) = yabe,
P (a, b, e|1, 0) = zabe, P (a, b, e|1, 1) = uabe,
P (a, b, e|2, 0) = vabe, P (a, b, e|2, 1) = wabe. (10)
We regard abe as a binary number, for example,
P (1, 0, 1|0, 0) = x101 = x5.
Now let us rewrite the constraints regarding measure-
ment outcomes. For Eqs. (3) and (4), we have, respec-
tively,
x0 + x1 = x6 + x7 =
p
2
+
1− p
4
,
x2 + x3 = x4 + x5 =
1− p
4
, (11)
and
y0 + y1 = y2 + y3 = y4 + y5 = y6 + y7 =
1
4
. (12)
For Eq. (5), we have
A0 +A1 = A6 +A7 = α
A2 +A3 = A4 +A5 = β, (13)
where A = z, u, v. For Eqs. (6), we have
w0 + w1 = w6 + w7 = β
w2 + w3 = w4 + w5 = α. (14)
We can see that Eqs. (11)-(14) make the normalization
in Eq. (2) satisfied. Thus the normalization condition is
redundant and can be removed.
The no-signaling condition in Eq. (7) can be expressed
as
xi + xi+2 = yi + yi+2,
zi + zi+2 = ui + ui+2,
vi + vi+2 = wi + wi+2, (15)
where i = 0, 1 and 4, 5. We can see that, by Eqs. (11)-
(14), the case when i = 0, 4 implies the case when 1, 5,
respectively. Thus the latter cases can be removed. The
no-signaling condition in Eq. (8) can be expressed as
xj + xj+4 = zj + yj+4,
zj + zj+4 = vj + vj+4,
yj + yj+4 = uj + uj+4,
uj + uj+4 = wj + wj+4, (16)
where j = 0, 1, 2, 3. We can also see that, by Eqs. (11)-
(14), the case when j = 0, 2 implies the case when j =
1, 3, respectively. Thus the latter cases are redundant
and can be removed. We can verify that Eqs. (A6) and
(A7) (or equivalently, Eqs. (7) and (8)) lead to Eq. (9),
which can thus be removed. As a result, we can remove
all variables Bi where B = x, y, z, u, v, w and i is an odd
number.
Therefore, by non-negativity of each quantity, the
space in which we optimize IBE(2) is as follows:
0 ≤ xk ≤ p
2
+
1− p
4
, 0 ≤ xl ≤ 1− p
4
, (17)
where k = 0, 6 and l = 2, 4,
0 ≤ yj ≤ 1
4
, (18)
where j=0,2,4,6, and
0 ≤ Ak ≤ α, 0 ≤ Al ≤ β,
0 ≤ wk ≤ β, 0 ≤ wl ≤ α, (19)
where A = z, u, v and k = 0, 6 and l = 2, 4. The con-
straints are those that remain in Eqs. (15) and (16) after
removing odd numbered variables.
Because the key is generated only from the results
where x = y = 0, we need to consider the joint distribu-
tion P (∆, b, e|0, 0) ≡ R(b, e). Now, the guessing proba-
bility
PE = R(0, 0) +R(1, 1) = x0 + x4 + x3 + x7
= (x0 + x4)− (x2 + x6) + 1
2
, (20)
where Eqs. (10) and (11) are used.
To maximize the guessing probability, we use linear
programming [16]. First we note that the constraints
(17)-(19) define a convex set. We define C ∈ [0, 12 ]× [0, 12 ]
as the projection of this set onto the (a, b)-plane where
a ≡ x0 + x4 and b ≡ x2 + x6. We notice that C is convex
and is symmetric under transformations (a, b) ↔ (b, a)
and (a, b)↔ ( 12−a, 12−b). In our case the linear function
PE can be directly optimized using linear programming.
Specifically, for fixed value of the noise parameter p, we
perform the following optimization:
PmaxE =
{
max PE(a, b)
subject to (a, b) ∈ C. (21)
D. Maximizing IBE
Now we obtain a bound on the mutual information,
IBE , from the guessing probability PE . There is a simple
relation for the problem [12]: Let us consider a marginal
distribution for Bob and Eve, R(i, j). Here Eve is not
binary-restricted (i = 0, 1 and j = 0, 1, 2, ...). Consider
conditional probabilities P (0|j) and P (1|j) due to the
joint probability R(i, j). The joint probabilities can be
4written as R(i, j) = P (i|j)P (j), where P (j) is a marginal
distribution for Bob. The mutual information is
IBE = H(i)−H(i|j)
= H(i)−
∑
j
H[P (0|j)]P (j), (22)
where the binary entropy function H[q] ≡ −[q log2 q +
(1 − q) log2(1 − q)] has been introduced. Let PE(j) be
Eve’s probability to guess Bob’s outcome correctly, when
her outcome is j. However, we can observe that PE(j) =
max{P (0|j), P (1|j)}. Because H[P (0|j)] = H[P (1|j)] =
H[PE(j)] here, we have
IBE = H(i)−
∑
j
H[PE(j)]P (j), (23)
The (average) guessing probability is PE =∑
j PE(j)P (j). However, for a fixed PE , the smallest
value of the quantity
∑
j H[PE(j)]P (j) is obtained when
each PE(j) take either 1/2 or 1, by the concavity of the
binary entropy as discussed in Ref. [12]. Let r denote
the sum of all P (j) such that PE(j) = 1/2. Then we
have PE = 1− (r/2) and thus∑
j
H[PE(j)]P (j) ≥ r = 2(1− PE). (24)
Now we obtain
IBE = H(i)−
∑
j
H[PE(j)]P (j)
≤ 1− 2(1− PE) = 2PE − 1, (25)
where the constraint H(i) = 1 is used. Therefore we get
IBE ≤ 2PE − 1. (26)
Using the relation (26) and the maximal guessing prob-
ability obtained by linear programming, we can get a
bound on IBE as shown in Fig. 1. Then, by the Csisza´r-
Ko¨rner formula [15], we can get a lower bound on the
key generation rate K = IAB − IBE . As we can see, in
the regime p < 1√
2
where the Werner state admits a lo-
cal realistic model, Eve has full information about Bob,
namely PE = 1, so there can be no secret key. However,
in the regime where 1√
2
≤ p ≤ 1, Eve’s information is
restricted. When p = 1, IBE = 2−
√
2 ' 0.586 and IAB
is equal to 1, giving maximal K = 0.414. The region
where we have non-zero K is 0.9038 ≤ p ≤ 1. The key
generation rate we obtained is the same as optimal rate
found in Eq. (8) in Ref. [6].
III. CONCLUSION
We outlined a straightforward approach for obtain-
ing a secret key rate using only no-signaling constraints
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FIG. 1: Mutual informations depending on the noise param-
eter p. Positive key is possible in the region where IBE is
smaller than IAB (dashed line).
and linear programming. Assuming an individual attack,
we considered all possible joint probabilities. We ini-
tially examined the case where Eve has binary outcomes.
We imposed constraints due to the no-signaling principle
and given measurement outcomes. Within the remaining
space of joint probabilities, by using linear programming,
we optimized the guessing probability between Bob and
Eve. We then presented an inequality that relates the
guessing probability to the mutual information between
Bob and a general Eve who is not binary-restricted. Us-
ing the bound and the Csisza´r-Ko¨rner formula [15], we
lower bounded the final key generation rate. The op-
timal value of the key generation rate, obtained in the
noiseless case p = 1, exactly matches the result from Ref.
[6]. However, our approach does not require any spe-
cific knowledge of the no-signaling polytopes, instead re-
lying on linear programming techniques to optimize the
relevant quantities. Thus, our approach holds promise
for application to other protocols, where the structure of
the no-signaling polytopes cannot be determined analyt-
ically.
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